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Emotion regulation involves the cogni-
tive control of inappropriate or unwanted
emotional reactivity. Modern use of blood
oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD)
functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) has begun to elucidate the
neural regions whose activity correlates
with emotion regulation. Research has
focused on prefrontal involvement in
emotional control, with the dorsolateral
aspect (dlPFC) interacting with the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and
amygdala to modulate emotional reac-
tivity (Johnstone et al., 2007; Delgado
et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2008). There has
been less focus on how prefrontal control
regions might interact with other regions.
For example, it is suggested that, consis-
tent with the role of voluntary attention in
the biased competition model (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995), emotion regula-
tion works by augmenting goal-relevant
stimulus or semantic representations in
the occipitotemporal cortices (Blair and
Mitchell, 2009; Buhle et al., 2013). In this
manner, while processing resources are
prioritized to goal-relevant representa-
tions, unwanted emotional information
is indirectly suppressed. The resolution of
this debate has been slowed partly due to
the low temporal resolution inherent in
the BOLD signal. With fMRI it is unclear
whether modulation of a particular region
occurs following either stimulus onset or
regulation onset. A recent article in the
Journal of Neuroscience by Harris et al.
(2013) reconciles some of the ambigu-
ity regarding the neural underpinnings
of emotion regulation. Specifically, their
findings suggest a dual process model
for the cognitive control of emotional
significance.
Harris et al. (2013) overcome the
temporal limitations of fMRI by using
electroencephalography (EEG), and pro-
vide novel insight into the neurocogni-
tive mechanisms involved in the cognitive
control of positive stimuli. They mea-
sured event-related potentials (ERPs) first
while participants viewed food options
and reported which they would prefer
to eat, and later while they attempted
to exert self-control over their selec-
tions. In other words, in the critical self-
control session participants were required
to regulate their emotional response to
rewarding food cues in favor of goal-
relevant healthy choices. Harris et al.
(2013) observed an increase in the N1
amplitude of the occipital cortex between
150 and 200ms in successful relative to
failed self-control trials, which as they
note is thought to relate to the atten-
tional modulation of early visual cortices.
Importantly, significant occipital modula-
tion did not occur in the natural choice
session in which participants were not
required to control their responses. The
authors also found that successful self-
control trials were associated with signif-
icantly higher phase-locked activation in
the alpha-band between dlPFC and occip-
ital cortex during the 100–150ms after
stimulus onset. This supports the inter-
pretation that the dlPFC was involved in
the modulation of occipital activity dur-
ing the self-control conditions early on in
information processing. Thus, it appears
that attentional processes involving the
dlPFC can modulate affective significance
by filtering out unwanted stimulus repre-
sentations of emotional significance. Such
a mechanism resembles perceptual selec-
tion and top-down biased-competition
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995).
In addition to the early attentional pro-
cess, Harris and colleagues observed that
dlPFC modulates vmPFC activity at a later
stage of information processing, which
is important for influencing the repre-
sentation of affective value. Specifically,
the vmPFC activity was modulated as
a function of self-control and Granger
causality analyses indicated dlPFC modu-
lated this vmPFC activity at a later time
point than the dlPFC-occipital interac-
tions (400–650ms). Putting their findings
together, Harris et al. (2013) conclude
that the self-control of desirable food is a
product of both the early attention-related
filtering of occipital cortices, and the
late modulation of the vmPFC valuation
system.
Although Harris et al. (2013) briefly
note that their findings might have
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implications for models of emotion reg-
ulation, they do not go far enough in
relating their findings to the broader
context of emotion regulation. Below
we discuss the implications of Harris
et al. (2013) findings for models of dis-
orders of emotion with a particular
emphasis on the relevance of their early
attentional filtering findings to depres-
sion. Later we briefly discuss a model
which may prove useful in elucidating the
precise role of early attention in emotion-
related processing, including emotion
regulation.
To date, influential theories (Phillips
et al., 2008) and empirical studies
(Johnstone et al., 2007) regarding emo-
tion regulation impairments in disorders
of emotion, including depression, have
justifiably focused on the prefrontal
cortex—sometimes masking out all other
cortical regions—and their subcortical
connections. Indeed the findings of Harris
et al. (2013) confirm the potential impor-
tance of connections between the dlPFC
and vmPFC in the modulation of value-
based behavioral responding. However,
their findings also highlight that those
same models have overlooked the impor-
tance of dlPFC connections to, and the
attentional control of, perceptual cortices
involved in early stimulus and seman-
tic representations. This is consistent with
novel evidence demonstrating that in indi-
viduals with depression there is abnormal
modulation of early perceptual regions
during emotion regulation (Greening
et al., 2013) and that occipital cortex
reactivity to emotional stimuli predicts
future treatment response (Furey et al.,
2013). Together, such findings emphasize
that future work is needed to elucidate
how emotional significance might interact
with attention-related neural mechanisms
in early perceptual regions to influence
psychopathologies like depression.
The arousal-biased competition (ABC)
theory may provide a useful frame-
work for testing predictions regarding the
interactions between attention and emo-
tional reactivity. It builds on the bias-
competition framework by incorporating
emotional arousal. ABC suggests that
emotional arousal strengthens and sharp-
ens neural representations of high priority
(goal relevant and/or perceptually salient)
cues, while suppressing representations
of low priority cues in a winner-takes-
more and loser-takes-less manner (Mather
and Sutherland, 2011). ABC accounts
for the seemingly disparate findings that
at times emotions can enhance neural
activity and facilitate behavior, while at
other times they produce impairments
(Lee et al., 2014). During emotion reg-
ulation, one prediction is that the sup-
pression of unwanted emotional percepts
requires increased attentional control dur-
ing arousing situations. Emotional per-
cepts tend to be intrinsically high-priority.
When emotionally aroused, they should
dominate processing even more, thus
requiring enhanced attention control to
be suppressed. In this manner, ABC may
serve as a useful model for future research
into the role of attention in the early mod-
ulation of emotional representations in
occipitotemporal cortices.
Taking advantage of the high tempo-
ral resolution of ERPs, Harris et al. (2013)
demonstrated that the regulation of posi-
tive emotional reactivity involves both the
early modulation of occipital cortex con-
sistent with models of executive attention
and perceptual filtering, and the late mod-
ulation of vmPFC activity relating to stim-
ulus value. When viewed in the broader
context, these findings have potentially far
reaching implications for both our basic
understanding of emotion regulation, and
for furthering our understanding of how
emotion regulation goes awry in disorders
of emotion.
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